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Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action
for Loss of Parental Consortium?
I. INTRODUCTION
Black's Law Dictionary has defined "consortium" to mean the
"conjugal fellowship of Husband and Wife, and the right of each to
the company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other
in every conjugal relation."' Black's further states that "damages
for loss of consortium are commonly sought in wrongful death ac-
tions, or when [a] spouse has been seriously injured through [the]
negligence of another; or by [a] spouse against [a] third person al-
leging that he or she has caused [a] breaking up of the marriage."2
Black's also defines the action to include the loss or impairment of
sexual relations and that the action "is a separate cause of action
belonging to the spouse of the injured married partner and though
derivative in the sense of being occasioned by injury to [the]
spouse, is a direct injury to the spouse who has lost the
consortium."'
As observed by professors Prosser and Keeton, the loss of con-
sortium claim is derived from the marital relationship and the
rights attendant upon that relationship.4 Accordingly, a substantial
majority of American Courts have refused to extend recovery for
loss of consortium beyond the spousal relationship.5 A small group
of courts, however, have expanded the action beyond the spousal
relationship, permitting recovery between parent and child, un-
married consorts, and married consorts when the injury occurred
before marriage.' Pennsylvania, remaining consistent with the view
of a majority of American Courts, has refused to extend a cause of
action for loss of consortium beyond the spousal relationship.7
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 280 (5th Ed. 1979).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 125 at 932 (5th Ed.
1984).
5. Id.
6. Id. See infra, notes 60 to 68 and accompanying text for jurisdictions permitting a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium.
7. See, Steiner by Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505, 517 A.2d 1348
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This comment considers the narrow issue of whether Pennsylva-
nia should join the minority view of American Courts and extend a
cause of action to a child for the loss of parental consortium when
the parent is negligently injured by a third party tortfeasor. The
analysis begins with a brief and concise history of the development
of the loss of consortium action and then shifts its focus to a re-
view of relevant case law in Pennsylvania regarding the subject
cause of action. The Comment considers the arguments for and
against the adoption of a cause of action for the loss of parental
consortium and concludes that Pennsylvania should not judicially
expand recovery for loss of consortium beyond the spousal
relationship.
II. CONCISE HISTORY
Early on, the common law recognized a cause of action in the
master for the loss of a servant's services when the servant was
injured by a third party tortfeasor s By 1619, the Common Law
Courts extended that right to a husband allowing him to recover
for the loss of marital services from a tortfeasor who had injured
his wife.' Until comparatively recently, however, there was no simi-
lar action in favor of a wife when her husband was injured.1 ° It was
not until 1950, in Hitaffer v. Argonne, Co.," that an American
Court allowed a wife to recover for loss of consortium."2 Today, a
majority of American Courts allow the loss of consortium claim to
either spouse "as a matter of reform in the Common Law or as a
matter of equal protection under constitutional or statutory provi-
sions."'13 Still, as previously mentioned, courts have been reluctant
(1986), allocatur granted, 516 Pa. 627, 532 A.2d 437 (1987), affirmed without opinion, 518
Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988); Schroeder v. Ear, Nose and Throat Associates of Lehigh Valley,
Inc., 383 Pa. Super. 440, 557 A.2d 21 (1989).
8. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 125 at 931 (5th ed.
1984).
9. Id. See also, Donald J. Farage, Excerpts from a Symposium on Tort Law Develop-
ments in 1987, 92 DICK. L. REV. 133 (1987).
10. PROSSER AND KEETON at 931. Since then the Husband's claim for consortium devel-
oped by an expansion of the "services" owed to him by the wife, and since he owed the wife
no services at all, it followed that she had no claim when he was injured. Id.
11. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (195), overruled on other
grounds, Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
914 (1957). The Hittafer court defined "consortium" to include not only marital services but
also love, affection, companionship, and sexual relations. 183 F.2d at 819.
12. Id.
13. PROSSER AND KEETON at 932.
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to extend recovery for loss of consortium beyond the spousal
relationship.
III. PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania has long recognized that where a third party has
tortiously caused personal injuries to a wife, the husband is enti-
tled to recover damages from the third party tortfeasor for the loss
of consortium resulting from the wife's injuries.14 Early Pennsylva-
nia law did not grant the wife a similar cause of action.1" As late as
1960, in Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 6 Pennsylvania continued to deny
the wife recovery for loss of consortium when her husband was tor-
tiously injured by a third-party." It was not until 1974, in Hopkins
v. Blanco,"5 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court permitted a wife
to recover for loss of consortium as a matter of right under the
Equal Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.' As
mentioned above in the Introduction, Pennsylvania Courts have
refused to extend the loss of consortium action beyond the spousal
relationship and accordingly have refused to recognize a cause of
action for loss of parental consortium when a parent sustains per-
sonal injuries as a result of the conduct of a third-party
tortfeasor.20
Two recent Pennsylvania Superior Court opinions, Steiner by
14. See, Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A.2d 353 (1914) (holding that
"the right to recover for loss of consortium is confined to cases where a husband sues for
injuries to his wife"); Brown v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 437 Pa. 348, 263 A.2d 423 (1970);
Link v. Highway Express Lines, Inc., 444 Pa. 447, 282 A.2d 727 (1971). See also, 21 STAN-
DARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2d § 116:48.
15. See, Farage, Excerpts from a Symposium on Tort Development, at 134.
16. 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960). Justice Musmanno's dissent in Neuberg later
became the prevailing rule allowing the wife to recover.for loss of consortium resulting from
injury to her husband. (See, Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974), permitting
a wife to recover for loss of consortium under the Equal Rights Amendment to the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.)
17. Id.
18. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974). Hopkins held that under the Equal Rights
Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, since a Husband has a right to recover dam-
ages from a third person for loss of consortium in connection with personal injuries to his
wife, the wife must be given an equal right, and to deny a wife the right to recover damages
from a third person for loss of consortium in connection with personal injuries to her hus-
band would violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Thus, since the Husband is permitted to
recover for the loss of his wife's consortium, under the Equal Rights Amendment to the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the wife must similarly be allowed to recover for the loss of her
husband's consortium. 21 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2d § 116:48.
19. Id.
20. See supra, note 7 and accompanying text.
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Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co.,21 and Schroeder v. Ear, Nose and
Throat Assoc.,22 demonstrate this reluctance. In Steiner, the chil-
dren of a parent injured by an unknown assailant while trying to
dial for help sought to recover against Bell Telephone Company.23
The Steiners alleged that Bell was liable to them for the injury to
their family relationship "resulting from their parents' marital
breakdown caused by the criminal attack on their mother which
could have been avoided had Bell Telephone not negligently han-
dled their mother's telephone call. 4 The trial court granted Bell's
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed
the Steiners' complaint for failure to state a cause of action.25 The
Steiners appealed the trial court's order dismissing their complaint
and the appeal was certified to be argued before the Pennsylvania
Superior Court en banc.26
The issue before the Superior Court was whether Pennsylvania
should recognize a cause of action by a child for loss of parental
consortium, when the parent is injured by a third party tortfeasor's
negligence. In affirming the trial court's order dismissing the
Steiners' complaint, the Superior Court refused to recognize a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium.2"
Judge Rowley, writing for the majority" in Steiner, began his
legal analysis by acknowledging that there was a division of au-
thority among the sister states as to whether a child's action for
loss of parental consortium was recognized.29 The majority stated
that only six states recognized a child's cause of action for loss of
parental consortium resulting from a third party tortfeasor's injury
to a parent, while the majority of states refused to recognize such a
cause of action. 0 From this, the Steiner Court declared, "We do
21. 358 Pa. Super. 505, 517 A.2d 1348 (1986), allocatur granted, 516 Pa. 627, 532 A.2d
437 (1987), affirmed without opinion, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988).
22. 383 Pa. Super. 440, 557 A.2d 21 (1989).
23. 527 A.2d at 1348.
24. Id. at 1349.
25. Id.
26. Id., Judges Cirillo, Brosky, Rowley, Wieland, Montemurro, Beck, Popovich and
Johnson participated in the decision of the case. Judge Tamila did not participate in the
decision.
27. 517 A.2d at 1349.
28. Judge Brosky filed a dissenting opinion.
29. 517 A.2d at 1354.
30. Id. The majority stated that the following jurisdictions recognized a cause of ac-
tion for loss of parental consortium: Hay v. Medical Center of Vermont, 145 Vt. 533, 496
A.2d 939 (1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984);
Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984); Weitl v. Moes, 311
N.W.2d 259 (Iowa, 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413
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not find a general consensus among state courts to allow the cause
of action." 1
The Steiner majority relied, in essence, on two bases in their de-
termination not to judicially recognize the subject cause of ac-
tion.32 First, the majority stated that "[t]he difference in creation
of spousal and filial relationships justifies the differential treat-
ment between spouses and children."3 3 The majority explained
that spouses enter into their relationships freely and by choice
whereas the child has no control over the commencement of the
parent/child relationship.34 The court further opined that although
both relationships involve love, companionship, affection, guidance
and care, the relationships are "substantively. . . different and are
not comparable."35
The Steiner majority discussed the question raised in Steiner as
a policy issue of how far to "extend liability beyond the ordinary
principles of negligence which limit liability to those who are im-
mediately injured and to those for whom liability is established by
some legal source other than foreseeability. '36 The Steiner court
also reasoned that the legislature is better equipped in weighing
the benefits of allowing children to have a right to recover damages
for loss of parental consortium and accordingly stated that the leg-
islature "is the appropriate entity to determine if Pennsylvania
will recognize a child's cause of action for loss of parental consor-
tium and under what circumstances. 3 7
N.E.2d 690 (1980); and Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), afl'd,
411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 242 (1981). At least three more jurisdictions have recognized the
cause of action since Steiner. See infra, notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
31. 517 A.2d at 1354.
32. See generally, 517 A.2d at 1354-57.
33. Id. at 1355. The Steiner court stated that:
Spouses enter into their relationships freely and by choice and do so to bind one
another in a permanent unity. A child, however, has no control over the commence-
ment of the parent/child relationship, and rather than trying to become one with his
parents, he perpetually strives to develop from a totally dependent person to one
which is entirely independent. Although both relationships involve love, companion-
ship, affection, guidance and care, the nature of these elements, the ends which they
ideally achieve, and the means by which they reach those ends is subtly but intrinsi-
cally different. Therefore, although identical labels can be attached to the elements of
the spousal relationship and the parent/child relationship, substantively the relation-




36. Id. at 1356. The court cited Northwest v. Presbyterian Inter Community Hospital,
293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318, 333 (1982), for support.
37. Id. at 1356. The Steiner court opined:
1990
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The majority also asserted that their reluctance to judicially ex-
pand tort liability was supported by Justice Flaherty's concurring
opinion in Mazzagatti v. Everingham.3 s In Mazzagatti, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court declined to expand tort liability for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress of a close relative who arrived
at the scene of an accident shortly after it took place.3 9 Justice Fla-
herty stated:
It is illusory to believe the public does not pay for tort recoveries, or that
resources for such are limitless. As it is with everything, a balance must be
struck-certain limits drawn. We are, in the end dealing with money, and
that money must come from somewhere-from someone: the public pays for
the very most part by increased insurance premiums, taxation, prices paid
for consumer goods, medical services, and in loss of jobs when the manufac-
turing industry is too adversely affected. A sound and viable tort sys-
tem-generally what we now have-is a valuable incident of our free soci-
ety, but we must protect it from excess lest it becomes unworkable and alas
we find it replaced with something far from desirable."
In concluding, the Steiner Court stated that:
because there is no constitutional mandate compelling us to recognize a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium, because there is presently no
legal basis for allowing the cause of action, because there is no general or
.growing consensus that such a cause of action should be established, and
because to allow such a cause of action is a policy determination which can
most thoroughly and representatively be considered and resolved by the leg-
islature, we do not recognize a child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium due to tortious interference of a third party."1
The legislature has more widespread resources to utilize the benefits of allowing chil-
dren to have a right to recover damages for loss of parental consortium due to negli-
gent injury and is the appropriate entity to determine if Pennsylvania will recognize a
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium and under what circumstances.
The legislature has the ability to enact legislation for wrongful injury patterned on.
the wrongful death statute. Concern about increased litigation and multiple claims
could thereby be addressed by allowing only one action to be brought and only one
recovery to be made which must be shared by some legislatively determined appor-
tionment among the legislatively determined class of beneficiaries. The legislature is
also the more appropriate branch of government to establish the suggested new cause
of action because then, if it is determined that some recovery should be allowed but
that the benefits of unlimited recovery are outweighed by the cost to society, the
legislature can establish a rule of law allowing partial recovery under circumstances
and upon conditions which the people's representatives have established to be fairest
and most beneficial to all.
Id.
38. Id. at 1357. Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 516 A.2d 672 (1986).
39. 517 A.2d at 1357.
40. Id. (citing Mazzagatti, 512 Pa. at 281, 516 A.2d at 680 (1986)).
41. 517 A.2d at 1357.
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Judge Brosky dissented from the majority opinion in Steiner.2
The dissent found the majority's bases for denying the Steiners'
claim for loss of parental consortium unpersuasive.43 Judge Brosky
criticized the majority's conclusion that "[tihe difference in crea-
tion of spousal and filial relationships justifies the differential
treatment between spouses and children. '44 The dissent opined
that the majority failed to explain why this distinction should
make a difference as to which relationship is to receive protection
in our courts.4' The dissent also rebutted the majority's opinion
that whether to allow the cause of action is a policy determination
which is best left.to the legislature to resolve." In so doing, the
dissent referred to the case of Ferriter v. O'Connell's Sons, Inc.7
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
As for the argument that we should withhold our hand until the legislature
acts, we need only repeat: In a field long left to the Common Law, change
may well come about by the same medium of development. Sensible reform
can here be achieved without the articulation of detail or the creation of the
administrative mechanisms that customarily comes about by legislative en-
actment . . .In the end, the legislature may say that we have mistaken the
present public understanding of the nature of the [parent-child] relation,
but that we cannot divine or anticipate.4
In concluding, Judge Brosky stated that the majority had not ad-
vanced any affirmative reasons for denying the subject cause of ac-
tion, and would therefore reverse the trial court's order dismissing
the Steiners' complaint and allow Michael Steiner a cause of action
for the loss of his mother's consortium.49
More recently, in Schroeder v. Ear, Nose and Throat Assoc.,50
the Pennsylvania Superior Court again refused to recognize a
child's action for loss of parental consortium. 1 In Schroeder, a
medical malpractice action was brought against physicians who
failed to inform a patient of a Hodgkins disease diagnosis and/or
that a C-T scan was recommended by a radiologist.62 The patient,
42. 517 A.2d at 1357-58.
43. Id. at 1357.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1358.
47. Id., Ferriter v. O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980).
48. Id. (citing Ferriter, 418 N.E.2d at 695).
49. 517 A.2d at 1358.
50. 383 Pa. Super. 440, 557 A.2d 21 (1989).
51. 557 A.2d at 23.
52. Id. at 21. -
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whose subsequent pregnancy was terminated in the course of treat-
ment for the Hodgkin's disease, alleged that the physicians were
negligent in their care and treatment and for failing to inform her
of prior X-ray results.5 3 The Complaint sought recovery for, inter
alia, loss of consortium by the patient's husband, loss of parental
consortium on behalf of the patient's minor child, and for the loss
of services, society and companionship of the aborted fetus by the
patient, her husband and the minor child. 4
In response to the defendants' preliminary objections, Judge Mc-
Ginley of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County struck all
counts of the Complaint regarding the minor's loss of consortium
claim as well as all claims for damages for loss of the child in
utero.55
On appeal, the Superior Court held, inter alia, that the minor
child had no claim against the mother's physicians for loss of pa-
rental consortium.5 6 The Court stated that "[a]ppellant's argu-
ment, that Lauren is entitled to recovery for injury to her mother,
has been disposed of by this court in Steiner by Steiner v. Bell
Telephone Company,.... and our Order refusing to recognize loss
of parental consortium as a cause of action has been affirmed with-
out opinion."57 The Schroeder Court concluded that consistent
with the seminal case of Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh,58 the right to
enter claims for loss of consortium have been limited to spouses. 9
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
While no clear trend has emerged favoring the acceptance of a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium, courts in at least
nine (9) jurisdictions have recognized the cause of action. Arizona
(1989), e° Indiana (1988),11 Alaska (1987),62 Vermont ((1985), e
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id. at 22.
57. Id.
58. 243 Pa. 521, 90 A.2d 353 (1914). In Quinn, a 10 year old girl was injured after
falling from a bridge when she leaned against the bridge's wooden railing. 90 A.2d at 354.
The trial judge included in his instructions to the jury that the jury could consider the
companionship that the injured child would give to her mother. Id. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held this was error and stated that "[tihe right to recover for loss of compan-
ionship is confined to cases where a husband sues for injuries to his wife." Id.
59. 557 A.2d at 23.
60. Villareal v. State Dept. of Transp., - Ariz. __, 774 P.2d 213 (1989). Villareal
held that children may recover for loss of consortium of a parent, overruling Jeyne v. Del E.
Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954). The Villareal court limited "parent" to
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Washington (1984), 6" Wisconsin (1984), es Michigan (1981),"6 Iowa
(1981), 8" and Massachusetts (1980)."8 The remaining states, how-
ever, have not adopted the cause of action. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts also rejects the cause of action."
Courts have relied on various reasons in accepting or rejecting a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium. The following argu-
ments are most commonly relied upon in rejecting a cause of ac-
tion for loss of parental consortium: (1) No legal basis for such a
cause of action; (2) Lack of precedent; (3) The adoption of such a
cause of action is more properly a legislative function; (4) The like-
lihood of increased litigation through multiple claims; (5) Possibil-
ity of double recovery; (6) Interest in limiting the consequences of
a wrong to a controllable degree; (7) Difficulty in assessing dam-
ages; (8) The inherent differences in the spousal and the parent/
child relationships; (9) The fear that recognition of a child's cause
of action will lead the way to similar actions for siblings, grandpar-
ents, and parent substitutes; and (10) The additional burden
placed on society through increased insurance costs and the added
expenses of litigation and settlement.
Some of the reasons commonly advanced for recognizing the
cause of action are: (1) Society's increased recognition and aware-
mean only biological and adoptive parents. Also, the court held that the child may recover
only when the parent suffers a serious, permanent, disabling injury rendering the parent
unable to provide love, care, companionship, and guidance to the child.
61. Dearborn Fabricating & Engineering Corp. v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988). However, on March 27, 1990, the Supreme Court of Indiana vacated the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dis-
miss Count VII of the complaint regarding loss of parental consortium, and refused to rec-
ognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. Dearborn Fabricating and Engineer-
ing Corp. v. Wickham, N.E.2d __, 1990 WL 35624 (Ind.).
62. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987).
63. Hay v. Medical Center Hospital, 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939 (1985).
64. Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984).
65. Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984).
66. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981).
67. Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981). However, Weitl was overruled by
Audobon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983).
The Audobon Court stated that:
To the extent our plurality opinion in Weitl (1) granted a child an independent right
to bring such an action and (2) to the extent that it interpreted section 613.15 to
exclude intangible consortium damages, and (3) to the extent it limited the period of
damages to the child's minority, it is overruled.
335 N.W.2d at 152.
68. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A (1977). That section provides that "[o]ne
who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable to a parent for illness or other bodily harm is
not liable to a minor child for resulting loss of parental support and care." Id.
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ness of children as persons with rights; (2) The parent/child rela-
tionship is unique and deserves protection; (3) The loss of a par-
ent's love, care and companionship can severely impact a child's
development; (4) A child suffers a real and serious loss when a par-
ent is injured; and (5) Recognizing such a cause of action will not
increase litigation because compulsory joinder can easily solve this
problem.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above and because the reasons commonly
cited for adopting the subject cause of action are less persuasive,
Pennsylvania should not judicially extend a cause of action to a
child for the loss of parental consortium when a parent is injured
by the conduct of a third party tortfeasor. Such an extension of
tort liability is generally disfavored in the law. Also, to allow such a
cause of action, in essence, is to allow a cause of action for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress where there is no contem-
poraneous observance of the injury.' Furthermore, the potential
harm to the family which may be generated through the litigation
process must be anticipated. As recently recognized by the Su-
preme Court of Indiana in Dearborn Fabricating and Engineering
Corp. v. Wickham:7
1
We are particularly concerned that each claim for such damages will invite
defendants to minimize the claim by seeking to prove inadequacy and weak-
ness of a child's familial relationships, resulting in pretrial investigation,
depositions, trial testimony, and final argument attacking the quality of the
parent-child relationship enjoyed by the child before the parent's injuries.
Many loving children heretofore content would thus be likely to suffer sig-
nificant emotional harm inflicted by the litigation process itself, in addition
to that already resulting from the parent's injuries."
70. See Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everingham, 516 A.2d 672, 512 Pa. 266 (1986).
The Mazzagatti court held that a plaintiff who does not experience a contemporaneous ob-
servance of the injury to a close relative does not state a cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress under the parameters set forth in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
404 A.2d 672 (1979).
71. - N.E.2d - , 1990 WL 35624 (Ind.)
72. 1990 WL 35624 (Ind.) at p. 6. The Dearborn Court further opined:
While the parent-child relationship may presently be attacked in the litigation of a
parent's claim for loss of services, society, and companionship resulting from tortious
injuries to a child, we perceive such efforts as directed more at the adult parent
claiming the loss, with negligible potential for personal attack upon a child's values
and perceptions. Furthermore, an adult pursuing a claim for loss of society and com-
panionship or spousal consortium takes on the risk of litigation assault upon the fa-
milial relationship knowingly and voluntarily. But this is not so for a child. The par-
ent's attorney will likely include the child's claim with that of the parent as a matter
Comments
The likelihood of further expansion of consortium-like claims must
also be contemplated. Lastly, the adoption of a new cause of action
involves serious public policy concerns which are best left to the
legislature to deal.
Gregg A. Guthrie
of course. It is this consideration which persuades us that a child's loss of consortium
claim may be distinguished and treated differently from that of a parent or a spouse.
Id. at p. 6-7.
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